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NOTES AND COMMENTS
FREEDOM OF RELIGION AND OKLAHOMA
GUARDIANSHIPS: INRE POLIN
I. INTRODUCTION
Guardianship is a legal relationship created by statute' in which
one individual, the guardian, becomes a "substitute decisionmaker" for
another, the ward.2 The relationship commences following a hearing,
which "is society's way of informing a person that he is not competent
to manage his personal and/or financial affairs, and that for his own
best interests the state will appoint a substitute decision maker who will
care for his person and his estate."'3
In exercising authority over incapacitated persons, the states have
often sacrificed the procedural protection afforded the alleged incom-
petent by the Constitution.4 Chief Justice Burger has written that the
"historic parens patriae"5 of the state to assume authority over a person
1. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 58, §§ 851-876 (1981). An extensive tabulation of state guardi-
anship statutes may be found in ABA COMM'N ON THE MENTALLY DISABLED, GUARDIANSHIP
AND CONSERVATORSHIP 9-73 (1979).
2. See Sherman, Guardianship: Timefor a Reassessment, 49 FORDHAM L. REV. 350, 351
(1980);Vargyas, Guardianship, LEGAL RIGHTS OF MENTALLY DISABLED PERSONS 339, 341 (1979).
3. Comment, Constitutional Deiciencies in Oklahoma Guardianshio Law, 13 TULSA L.J. 579,
579 (1978) (citing Kindred, Guardianship and Limitations upon Capacity, THE MENTALLY RE-
TARDED CITIZEN AND THE LAW 63 (1976)). The primary purpose of Oklahoma guardianship is "to
protect people from dissipating the assets of their estates by virtue of incapacity, and to protect
these incapable of managing their affairs from being victimized by others desirous of depriving
them of their property." In re Polin, 675 P.2d 1013, 1014-15 (Okla. 1983). The Polin court
amended its original opinion by adding that "the statute also protects persons who for any reason
cannot make day-to-day decisions required of them in order to function within our society." In re
Polin, Id. at 1015; Polin, 55 OKLA. B.J. 268, 268 (Jan. 30, 1984).
4. See generally Sherman, supra note 2, at 350 (discussion of procedural and substantive
inadequacies of guardianship law); Comment, supra note 3, at 579 (fourteenth amendment
problems with Oklahoma's guardianship laws).
5. Parens patriae is the process through which the state assumes authority over a citizen
similar to the authority of a parent over a child. See Note, In re Boyer: Guardianship oflncapacl.
tated Adults in Utah, 1982 UTAH L. REV. 427, 428. One commentator has criticized the parens
patriae justification, stating:
One reason for the lesser degree of procedural protection afforded the alleged incompe-
tent is suggested by the regular judicial invocation of the mythical talismans---"best in-
terests,", "preventative and protective," and "parens patriae"-which are supposedly
descriptive of the proceeding as well as the role of the state. Far too often, however, this
1
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is accompanied by the inevitable consequence that the ward's personal
freedom will be substantially restrained.6  As a result of the tension
between the apparent best interest of the alleged incompetent and the
protection of the incompetent's constitutional rights, some state courts
and legislatures are becoming more sensitive to procedural safeguards
for alleged incompetents.7 Courts must determine whether guardian-
ships can be tailored in a way that will not infringe on the incompe-
tent's right to the free exercise of religion.
Recently, statutory guardianship laws and a state court's applica-
tion of these laws were challenged on the basis of the fundamental con-
stitutional right to the free exercise of religious beliefs.' The Oklahoma
Supreme Court in In re Polin 9 held that the district court's construction
of Oklahoma's guardianship statutes violated Ms. Polin's constitutional
right to the free exercise of her religious beliefs.' The purpose of this
Note is to examine the background and reasoning of In re Polin, and to
determine how the decision will affect Oklahoma guardianship law.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Facts Alleged
Robin Polin was an eighteen-year-old high school student who
had been deaf and mute since birth. She was raised in a Jewish family.
Beginning approximately March, 1982, Robin became interested in a
sect of Christianity which the trial court wrote "can only be called 'fun-
damentalist.' "II Robin decided to adopt the Christian faith despite the
language is used to conceal the significant deprivations which occur in the guardianship
process. The practical effect of such language is reflected by the inordinate amount of
discretion vested in the probate courts.
Comment, supra note 3, at 580 (footnotes omited).
6. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 583 (1975) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
7. See, e.g., In re Boyer, 636 P.2d 1085 (Utah 1981) (scope of guardianship limited accord-
ing to ward's incapacities). Boyer is discussed in Note, supra note 5, at 433-41. See also Cal. Prob.
Code §§ 1400-3803 (West 1981) (legislature restructured statutes to protect the incompetent's fun-
damental rights).
8. See In re Polin, 675 P.2d 1013 (Okla. 1983). The constitutional right to free exercise of
religion is found in U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establish-
ment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof....); see also OKLA. CONST. art. I, § 2
("Perfect toleration of religious sentiment shall be secured, and no inhabitant of the State shall
ever be molested in person or property on account of his or her mode of religious worship; and no
religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights.").
9. 675 P.2d 1013 (Okla. 1983).
10. Id
11. In re Polin, No. PG 83-76, slip op. at 1 (Dist. Ct. Tulsa Cty. Okla. 1983). For the reader's
convenience, this slip opinion is reproduced in an Appendix immediately following this Note.
1984]
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objections of her Jewish parents. On April 26, 1983, Robin left home.
In response, her parents brought an action in the Oklahoma District
Court for Tulsa County seeking a judicial declaration that Robin was
incompetent under Oklahoma statutory guardianship law.2
The district court found that Robin Polin was "judgementally im-
mature," capable of being manipulated by "artful and designing" per-
sons, and therefore incompetent under OKLA. STAT. tit. 58, §§ 851-852
(1981). 13 Robin's sister was appointed special or temporary guardian of
Robin's person and estate. Any interested party was permitted to apply
to the Court to be appointed permanent guardian.14 The temporary
guardian was advised of three specific restrictions:
(1) The ward is not to be controlled directly or indirectly by
Paul Polin [Robin's father] ....
(2) The right to a religious preference being a fundamental
constitutional right, the guardian is expressly forbidden
from interfering in Robin's chosen form of religious wor-
ship. The only exception to this restriction is if said reli-
gious practice would be of immediate danger to the
health or financial well-being of the ward ...
(3) The guardian shall not allow the ward to travel out of
the State of Oklahoma without Order of the Court. 1"
The Oklahoma Supreme Court reversed the trial court's decision,
stating that the trial court had construed the Oklahoma guardianship
statutes too broadly, resulting in a chilling infringement on Ms. Polin's
fundamental constitutional right to free exercise of her religious
beliefs.' 6
B. Issues Presented to the Oklahoma Supreme Court
The facts of Polin raise many important issues regarding guardian-
ship proceedings. In reaching a decision, the Oklahoma Supreme
Court had to determine the legislative intent as to the purpose of
12. I1; Plin, 675 P.2d at 1013.
13. See infra notes 74-84 and accompanying text.
14. In re Polin, No. PG 83-76, slip op. at 5 (Dist. Ct. Tulsa Cty. Okla. 1983).
15. Id at 6.
16. Polin, 675 P.2d at 1013. The Oklahoma Supreme Court's reversal allows Robin Polin to
make her own decisions as to where and with whom she should live. At the time of this writing,
however, the supreme court has not issued a mandate dissolving the guardianship created by the
district court, as provided in OKLA. S. CT. R. 33. Until the mandate is issued, Robin technically
remains under the guardianship of her sister and brother-in-law. Interview with Judge Robert D.
Frank, Judge of the District Court of Tulsa County, Oklahoma (March 9, 1984). Pending the
issuance of the mandate, Robin's father, Paul Polin, has petitioned the court to withhold its man-
date, and has petitioned the United States Supreme Court for certiorari. Id.
[Vol. 19:668
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guardianships and how to define "incompetence." Most importantly,
however, the court had to consider whether a guardianship could be
structured without denying the ward's constitutional right to free exer-
cise of religious beliefs. A background of the development of guardi-
anship law and its constitutional problems is helpful in understanding
the court's resolution of these issues.
III. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF GUARDIANSHIP LAW
A. Least Restrictive Alternative Doctrine
American guardianship laws are historically rooted in pre-fourth
century Roman and English law.'7 From this basis the doctrine of
"parens patriae" emerged in the English Chancery Courts in the late
seventeenth century." The doctrine is the process by which the state
assumes authority over incapacitated citizens and exercises powers sim-
ilar to those of a parent over his child.19 Parens patriae has been recog-
nized by the United States Supreme Court as being "inherent in the
supreme power of every state." 20
The Supreme Court, however, has limited the extent to which
states can exercise their parens patriae powers. In Shelton v. Tucker21
the United States Supreme Court stated that when the government has
a legitimate and substantial purpose, "that purpose cannot be pursued
by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the
end can be more narrowly achieved. 22
This approach is known as the "least restrictive alternative doc-
trine"2 3 and recognizes that a full guardianship is overinclusive in
17. The historical background of the development of guardianship law is discussed in S.
BRAKEL & R. ROCK, THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 1-14 (rev. ed. 1971); Sherman,
supra note 2, at 352; Vargyas, supra note 2, at 341-42; Note, supra note 5, at 428.
18. See Beverley's case, 76 Eng. Rep. 1118 (K.B. 1603); see also S. BRAKEL & R. ROCK, supra
note 17, at 2-3 (analysis of Lord Coke's opinion).
19. See Note, supra note 5, at 428.
20. Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints v. United States, 136 U.S.
1, 57 (1889).
21. 364 U.S. 479 (1960). Shelton involved associational rights of teachers.
22. Id at 488.
23. In re Boyer, 636 P.2d 1085 (Utah 1981) was one of the first cases applying the least
restrictive alternative doctrine to a state guardianship statute. The least restrictive alternative ap-
proach has also been applied to involuntary commitment proceedings in which state officials are
required to make "'good faith attempts to place. . . persons in settings that will be suitable and
appropriate to their mental and physical conditions while least restrictive of their liberties."' Id
at 1090 (quoting Welsch v. Likins, 373 F. Supp. 487, 502 (D. Minn. 1974)); see Rennie v. Klein,
462 F. Supp. 1131, 1146-47 (D.N.J. 1978); Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378, 392 (M.D. Ala.
1974),rev'don othergrounds, 651 F.2d 387 (5th Cir. 1981); State v. Krol, 68 N.J. 236, _ 344 A.2d
1984]
4
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 19 [1983], Iss. 4, Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol19/iss4/3
TULSA LAW JO URNAL [Vol. 19:668
many situations.24 It has most recently found expression in the Utah
Supreme Court case of In re Boyer, 25 in which the ward argued that she
was denied due process because the guardianship statute did not limit
the guardian's powers to those necessitated by the ward's incapacities,26
resulting in a deprivation of her fundamental rights. The Court agreed
with the ward's contentions and reasoned that when the state's interest
in protecting a ward's health and safety justifies imposition of a guardi-
anship, the state must narrowly tailor the guardianship to achieve that
goal.27
289, 303 (1975); Flaschner, Legal Rights of the Mentally Handicapped- A Judge's Viewpoint, 60
A.B.A. J. 1371, 1373 (1974).
Restrictions on many other constitutional rights have been affected by the least restrictive
alternative doctrine. See Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 515 (1979) (right to affiliate with political
party of one's choice); Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 267-70 (1974) (right to
travel); O'Brien v. Skinner, 414 U.S. 524, 533-35 (1974) (Marshall, J., concurring) (right to vote);
Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 642-49 (1974) (right to procreate); See generally
Hoffman and Foust, Least Restrictive Treatment of the Mentally I11- A Doctrine in Search of its
Senses, 14 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1100, 1101 n.l (1977) (background of application of doctrine by
federal courts); Sherman, supra note 2, at 366-71; Struve, The Less-Restrictive-Alternative Principle
and Economic Due Process, 80 HARv. L.REv. 1463 (1967) (discussion of application of least re-
strictive alternative doctrine as a test for the validity of economic regulations).
24. The least restrictive alternative approach is reflected in a California statute which pro-
vides for the appointment of a limited conservator as follows:
(d) A limited conservator of the person or of the estate, or both, may be appointed
for a developmentally disabled adult.
(1) Such limited conservatorships shall be utilized only as necessary to promote
and protect the well-being of the individual, shall be designed to encourage the develop-
ment of maximum self-reliance and independence of the individual, and shall be ordered
only to the extent necessitated by the individual's proven mental and adaptive limita-
tions.
(2) The conservatee of the limited conservator shall not be presumed to be incom-
petent and shall retain all legal and civil rights except those which by court order have
been designated as legal disabilities and have been specifically granted to the limited
conservator.
CAL. PROB. CODE § 1801 (West 1981). The least restrictive alternative approach is also found in
model statutes appearing in ABA COMM'N ON THE MENTALLY DISABLED, GUARDIANSHIP AND
CONSERVATORSHIP 101-103 (1979). Another model statute is proposed in G. ALEXANDER & T.
LEWIN, THE AGED AND THE NEED FOR. SURROGATE MANAGEMENT 141 (1972) (provides for a
sliding scale of interference with an individual's right to manage his personal affairs). But see
UNIF. PROB. CODE (contains no such provision for limited guardianship).
25. 636 P.2d 1085 (Utah 1981).
26. Id at 1087. The ward argued that she was denied due process in two other respects: The
statutory language was vague and the preponderance of the evidence standard for determining
incapacity, rather than clear and convincing, provided inadequate protection against an erroneous
decision to impose guardianship. The court accepted the latter contention. Id. at 1091. However,
the court held that the guardianship statute was not vague if construed to adjudge one incompe-
tent "only if the putative ward's decision-making process is so impaired that he is unable to care
for his personal safety or unable to attend to and provide for such necessities as food, shelter,
clothing, and medical care, without which physical injury or illness may occur." Id. at 1089 (citing
Fazio v. Fazio, 375 Mass. 394, 378 N.E.2d 951 (1978)). The court set aside the judgment and
remanded the case to the District Court. Id at 1092.
27. See id at 1090-1091 (court must consider the interest of the ward in retaining as broad a
5
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Other courts have also held that when state action affects religious
beliefs or practice, the state must adopt the least restrictive alternative
means to accomplish its legitimate objective.2" Thus, when a guardian-
ship conflicts with this fundamental, constitutionally protected right,
the guardianship must be carefully designed to accomplish its legiti-
mate objective with the least possible amount of interference with reli-
gious beliefs.
The United States Supreme Court first articulated the extent to
which laws could be enacted relative to the establishment of religion in
Reynolds v. United States.29 The Court drew a distinction between reli-
gious beliefs and religious acts, and only bestowed absolute protection
on religious beliefs and opinions.3" Limited protection of religious acts
was provided when such acts were in contradiction with generally ac-
ceptable legislation.3' In Cantwell v. Connecticut,32 the Court reaf-
firmed the absolute protection afforded religious beliefs and broadened
the protection afforded religious acts. However, Cantwell still recog-
nized that the act of worship can be affected by governmental action.
The Court stated that "the Amendment embraces two concepts,-free-
dom to believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute but, in the
nature of things, the second cannot be."'33 While consistently following
the Cantwell decision, the Supreme Court has subsequently identified
the difficulty in distinguishing between belief and action. In Wisconsin
v. Yoder,34 the court stated that its decision did "not become easier
because respondents were convicted for their 'actions' in refusing to
send their children to the public high school; in this context belief and
power of self determination as is consistent with the reason for appointing a guardian of the
person).
28. The first decision to influence the application of the least restrictive alternative doctrine
to state action affecting religious autonomy was Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939). Schneider
involved a municipal ordinance requiring acquisition of a police permit in order to solicit religious
contributions door-to-door. While the Court recognized the purpose of the ordinance to be for the
prevention of fraud, it noted that less restrictive means were available. Id at 164. The Court in
Schneider did not expressly connect the least restrictive alternative doctrine with concern for reli-
gious freedom. That link was provided in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940), in which
the Court held that conditioning religious solicitation upon the arbitrary grant of a license "is to
lay a forbidden burden upon the exercise of liberty protected by the Constitution" in light of the
availability of less drastic means to attain the state's purpose. Id at 307; see L. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14-10, at 846-59 (1978).
29. 98 U.S. 145 (1878). In Reynolds, Mormons unsuccessfully used religious freedom under
the first amendment as a defense to the practice of polygamy.
30. Id at 164.
31. Id at 165-66.
32. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
33. Id at 303-04.
34. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
19841
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action cannot be neatly confined in logic-tight compartments."35
The concept of religious freedom evolved rapidly as the Supreme
Court handed down several opinions in the ensuing years.3 6 New
guidelines were developed to test the constitutionality of laws affecting
religious worship including balancing37 and alternative means tests. 38
In Sherbert v. Verner,39 the Court held that a state cannot deny unem-
ployment compensation to persons whose religious beliefs render them
unavailable for Sunday employment. The Court based its decision on
two additional factors: the burden placed on the religion40 and
whether there is a compelling state interest which justifies denial of a
religious exemption.4'
These Supreme Court decisions present guidance in determining
the extent to which a guardianship can affect religion. A reasonable
inference can be drawn that a guardianship is not prohibited from af-
fecting religion, so long as it does not invade the area of religious belief.
Legislation reaching religious action can be defeated upon a showing
that there is not a compelling state interest, the burden placed on the
religion is not within the scope of that state interest, or that alternative
means exist to achieve that state interest.42 Furthermore, legislation
that passes these tests must not be applied in a way that unreasonably
interferes with religious action. The Oklahoma Courts have looked un-
favorably on the utilization of guardianships for any purpose inconsis-
tent with the state interest, and when so utilized, the guardianships
have been struck down.43
35. Id. at 220.
36. A discussion of the Supreme Court's opinion on freedom of religion may be found in
Lewelyn v. State, 592 P.2d 538, 540-542 (Okla. Crim. App. 1979).
37. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 165-66 (1944).
38. See Braunfeld v.'Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 605-08 (1961).
39. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
40. Id at 403-04.
41. Id at 406-09. The compelling state interest test was applied in Whitehorn v. State, 561
P.2d 539, 544 (Okla. Crim. App. 1977). The court in Whitehorn relied on Sherbert in reaching its
decision.
42. See Lewellyn v. State, 592 P.2d 538 (Okla. Crim. App. 1979) (interpreting the evolution
of religious freedom in Supreme Court decisions). In L'Aquarius v. Maynard, 634 P.2d 1310
(Okla. 1981), the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that denying an inmate the use of marijuana as a
sacrament for religious purposes did not violate guarantees of the first amendment. The court
relied on Lewelyn in reaching its decision.
43. See Taylor v. Gilmartin, 686 F.2d 1346 (10th Cir. 1982). The court stated that use of
Oklahoma's guardianship statutes for the clear purpose of getting some court protection of
deprogramming is impermissible. Id. at 631; see also In re Vaughn's Guardianship, 205 Okla.
438, 239 P.2d 403 (1951). The court stated that there can be no question that the incompetency
proceeding was filed in order that another lawsuit could not be removed to federal court based on
a lack of diversity between the non-resident guardian and non-resident defendant. Id at 440, 239
[Vol. 19:668
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B. Conflicts Between Freedom of Religion and Deprogramming
The issue of "deprogramming" has recently thrust itself into the
first amendment arena.' The claim that the use of a guardianship is
an infringement upon the constitutional right to the free exercise of
religion usually arises in cases involving the attempt to take custody of
an individual who has been allegedly brainwashed by a religious or-
ganization, so that the brainwashing process can be reversed and the
individual can be "deprogrammed,"45 Guardianship procedures have
been accorded various degrees of acceptance by the courts when used
as a legal tool to facilitate deprogramming.4 6 However, the constitu-
tional right to the free exercise of religion has more frequently served to
impede the guardianship procedure. 47  A recurring theme in
deprogramming decisions is the tension between the benefits to the in-
dividual and state afforded by guardianship and the infringement upon
the constitutional right to the free exercise of religion that sometimes
results from the guardianship.
Deprogramming is the process by which a brainwashed individual
undergoes encounter-style therapy in an attempt to reverse the influ-
ence of the brainwashing.4  Since the individual is brainwashed, the
P.2d at 405; see Hogan v. Leeper, 37 Okla. 655, 133 P. 190 (1913). In Hogan, the court held that a
76-year-old man's infatuation with a woman and desire to marry her was not a ground for the
appointment of a guardian. The court held that in filing for a guardianship for his father the son
was "actuated largely by a desire to secure the old man's property to himself and his brothers and
sisters." Id at 663, 133 P. at 193. But see Baer v. Baer, 450 F. Supp. 481 (N.D. Cal. 1978). Baer
involved a civil rights action against deprogrammers. The plaintiff argued that the defendants
used the California conservatorship law as a cover for the commission of tortious conduct. Plain-
tiff further alleged that defendants knowingly and fraudulently misused the conservator-
ship/guardianship process to obtain custody of him for the ulterior purpose of deprogramming.
The court ruled that this private misuse was not a denial of the plaintiff's constitutional rights. Id
at 487.
44. Deprogramming is the rehabilitation of one who has been brainwashed by a religious
cult. The existence of religious cults is not a new phenomenon. Historians, social scientists and
students of religion point out that cults, though cyclical in nature, have prospered and have en-
countered adversity for centuries. See Comment, Piercing the Religious Veil of the So-Called
Cults, 7 PEPPERDINE L. REv. 655, 655 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Piercing the Religious
Veil]. However, the increase in the number of such groups is new. Id at 655-56. What is also
new is "the way some members of modem society have chosen-in a supposedly enlightened age
of first amendment religious freedom--to fight new religious ideas. It is called deprogramming."
LeMoult, Deprogramming Members of Religious Sects, 46 FoRDHAM L.REv. 599, 599 (1978). See
generally Comment, Tort Liabilityfor Cult Deprogramming Peterson v. Sorlien, 43 OHIO ST. L.J.
465, 465-68 (1982) (discussion of the development of cults in the United States) [hereinafter cited
as Comment, Cult Deprogramming].
45. See notes 48-56 infra and accompanying text.
46. See notes 57-73 infra and accompanying text.
47. See notes 62-73 infra and accompanying text.
48. See Delgado, Religious Totalism: Gentle and Ungentle Persuasion Under the First Amend-
ment, 51 S. CAL. L. REv. 1, 7 (1977). One commentator described deprogramming as follows:
8
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deprogramming is usually involuntary. Speech is the brainwashing
process used by certain religious organizations in proselytizing new
members. Preaching, praying, chanting and meditating are the tools of
their trade.49 These techniques present a very practical barrier to
deprogrammers because they all constitute forms of speech that are
heavily protected by the Constitution. Any state action used to assist
the deprogramming process will be subject to scrutiny under the first
amendment as an infringement on religion and speech.
With few or no legal remedies, 50 the desperate parents and friends
of the brainwashed individuals often resort to lay deprogrammers who
The term deprogramming embraces two concepts, the first requires that an individ-
ual undergo an indoctrination of a cult's beliefs, the second involves a third party's ef-
forts to remove or "wash away" the effects of the indoctrination. The third party
generally acts at the request of a concerned parent but without the consent of the subject
individual, and as a result frequently encounters resistance and must therefore apply
physical force to subdue the cultist. The physical removal and detention of the individ-
ual in order to restore him to the values he held prior to indoctrination have prompted
cults to accuse the deprogrammers of kidnapping and false imprisonment. The
deprograminers euphemistically describe their course of conduct as a "rescue" of those
who were programmed or brainwashed by suspect organizations.
Comment, Piercing the Religious Veil, supra note 44, at 656 n.4. See generally T. PATRICK & T.
DULACK, LET OUR CHILDREN Go! (1976) (discussion of deprogramming process). The author,
Ted Patrick, is one of the most controversial deprogrammers active in the United States.
49. See LeMoult, supra note 44, at 610-611. Another commentator states:
In a noncriminal context, claims of coercive persuasion or mind control have been
raised with increasing frequency in connection with the activities of certain extremist,
youth-oriented religious organizations, such as the Unification Church, the Children of
God, the Hare Krishna, and the Love Family. These groups have come under fire from
parents, church groups, and government officials for recruiting young persons by decep-
tive means, making them dependent on the cult for emotional support, and gradually
conditioning them to accept a completely controlled, highly restricted lifestyle and a
world view drastically at odds with that of the prevailing society.
Delgado, supra note 48, at 5-6. Cults have been differentiated from established religions by the
existence of the following:
(1) Total allegiance to a powerful, living leader, often thought to be a messiah, whose
pronouncements form the basis for cult doctrine and practice;
(2) The prohibition of rational thought;
(3) Deceptive recruiting techniques;
(4) The use of coercive persuasion, mind control, and brainwashing techniques to at-
tract and retain members; and
(5) Isolation from the outside world.
Comment, Cult Deprogramming, supra note 44, at 466-67 (footnotes omitted).
50. One commentator stated:
Assuming that society may, consistently with the first amendment, impose limitations on
privately imposed psychological bondage, and that meaningful distinctions may be
drawn among the various degrees of influence, how are these limits to be enforced?...
Some of the remedies that have been developed or proposed ... under relevant first
amendment doctrine... include conservatorship proceedings, tort actions by parents
and ex-members, consumer protection legislation, and self help, including abduction and
deprogramming.
Delgado, supra note 48, at 9.
Several possible remedies have been suggested by this commentator:
(A) Preventive
9
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physically abduct cult members from street comers and religious com-
munes and attempt to reverse the cult's influence in locked motel
rooms.51 This conduct subjects the deprogrammers to tort claims such
as false imprisonment52 and intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress,53 in addition to claims based on federal kidnapping and civil
rights acts violations.14 Sometimes the deprogrammers are successful
in defending against these claims,55 but more frequently the claims are
upheld.56
One legal remedy resorted to by deprogrammers is the "tempo-
rary" or "emergency" guardianship or conservatorship.-7  Several
(1) Identification-similar to consumer protection rulings that require salesmen to
identify themselves and give their affiliation at a first encounter with the
candidate;
(2) Cooling off period-during which prospective members are required to leave
the group to reflect and seek advice;
(3) Public education;
(4) Prohibition on proselytizing by certain groups;
(5) Licensing-not outright prohibition but a regulation of the behavior modifica-
tion sciences to forbid unqualified individuals from engaging in psychologi-
cally intrusive practices; and
(6) Request for rescue-device, similar to a living will, consisting of a request to be
rescued if the individual comes under the influence of a religious cult, and a
statement that membership in a religious cult would be against his wishes.
(B) Post-Induction Remedies
(1) Self-help and deprogramming;
(2) Conservatorship and guardianship;
(3) A contract based remedy of mutual reassessments-bargaining with cult mem-
bers to allow member to voluntarily spend time outside of cult; and
(4) Remedies against the cult or cult leaders--civil remedies such as tort actions
and actions for return of money or property; criminal remedies such as kidnap
and federal statutes forbidding slavery and peonage.
See id. at 73-97.
51. See Delgado, supra note 48, at 7; Note, Cults, Deprogrammers, and the Necessity Defense,
80 MICH. L. REv. 271, 272 (1981); Comment, Cult Deprogramming, supra note 44, at 469-70;
Comment, Piercing the Religious Veil, supra note 44, at 670-71.
52. See Taylor v. Gilmartin, 686 F.2d 1346 (10th Cir. 1982); Peterson v. Sorlien, 299 N.W.2d
123 (Minn. 1980).
53. See Peterson v. Sorlien, 299 N.W.2d 123 (Minn. 1980).
54. See Ward v. Connor, 657 F.2d 45 (4th Cir. 1981); United States v. Patrick, 532 F.2d 142
(9th Cir. 1976); Mandelkorn v. Patrick, 359 F. Supp. 692 (D.D.C. 1973). A detailed discussion of
these types of violations may be found in Note, Federal Regulation of Inlra-Famiy Deprogram-
ming Conspiracies under the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871: Ward v. Connor, 23 B.C.L. REv. 789
(1982); Comment, Cult Deprogramming, supra note 44, at 470-73.
55. See United States v. Patrick, 532 F.2d 142 (9th Cir. 1976)(necessity defense upheld);
Weiss v. Patrick, 453 F. Supp. 717 (D.R.I. 1978)(subject of the deprogramming failed to prove any
injury or deprivation under § 1985 of the Civil Rights Act); Peterson v. Sorlien, 299 N.W.2d 123
(Minn. 1980) (court applied the plaintiff's delayed consent retroactively).
56. See Connor v. Ward, 657 F.2d 45 (4th Cir. 1981); Cooper v. Molko, 512 F. Supp. 563
(N.D. Cal. 1981); Mandelkorn v. Patrick, 359 F. Supp. 692 (D.D.C. 1973); People v. Patrick, 541
P.2d 320 (Colo. Ct. App. 1975); cf In re Rudie 622 P.2d 1098 (Oregon 1981) (disciplinary action
against attorney for participation in abduction in Washington pursuant to temporary guardian-
ship order issued in Oregon).
57. The conservatorship is a legal relationship related to guardianship, created by statute,
10
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states have enacted statutes58 providing for guardianships of brief dura-
tion following a hearing at which the moving party establishes the need
for protection. Testimony on radical behavior and mental change is
presented to persuade the judge to issue the temporary guardianship
order. "At the end of the period, typically twenty or thirty days, the
individual and his guardian or conservator reappear in court, at which
which gives the conservator power over only the estate of the conservatee. See OKLA. STAT. tit.
58, §§ 890.1-.11 (1981). Under Oklahoma law "a conservator has the same powers and duties as a
guardian except that a conservator does not have custody of the person." 13 Op. Att'y Gen. 177
(1981)(citing OKLA. STAT. tit. 58, § 890.5 (1981)); see also Coston v. Kamp, 549 P.2d 124, 127
(Okla. Ct. App. 1976) (duties and responsibilities of conservator and guardian do not materially
differ). The Uniform Probate Code, approved by the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws and by the ABA in August of 1969, includes provisions for protecting persons
(guardianships) and their property (conservatorships). UNIF. PROB. CODE, §§ 5-304, 5-401 (2)
(1974). But see Board of Regents v. Davis, 14 Cal. 3d 33, 533 P.2d 1047, 120 Cal. Rptr. 407 (1975),
wherein the court stated that one reason for the establishment of a conservatorship as an alterna-
tive to guardianship is to avoid the "stigma" of the label "incompetency." In such a situation, a
conservator is merely another linguistic designation for a guardian. Another reason for establish-
ing a conservatorship is to extend the parameter of guardianship statutes to embrace one who is
neither insane nor incompetent, but who, for a variety of other reasons, needed direction in the
management of his affairs. Id. at 37-39, 533 P.2d at 1051, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 410-11. The United
States Supreme Court has recognized that an individual's reputation, along with his personal lib-
erty, are interests of immense importance which require procedural protection. In re Winship, 397
U.S. 358, 367 (1970) (due process required when juvenile charged with an act which would consti-
tute a crime if committed by an adult).
58. See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-5310 (1975). The Arizona temporary guardianship stat-
ute provides:
If an incapacitated person has no guardian and an emergency exists, the court may
exercise the power of a guardian pending notice and hearing. If an appointed guardian
is not effectively performing his duties and the court further finds that the welfare of the
incapacitated person requires immediate action, it may, with or without notice, appoint a
temporary guardian for the incapacitated person for a specified period not to exceed six
months. A temporary guardian is entitled to the care and custody of the ward and the
authority of any permanent guardian previously appointed by the court is suspended so
long as a temporary guardian has authority. A temporary guardian may be removed at
any time. A temporary guardian shall make any report the court requires. In other
respects the provisions of this title concerning guardians apply to temporary guardians.
Id Similarly, the Oregon temporary guardianship statute states:
Appointment of temporary guardian for incapacitated person. If the court finds that
an emergency exists and no guardian has been appointed or that a guardian is not effec-
tively performing his duties or that the welfare of the incapacitated person requires im-
mediate action, the court may, with or without notice, appoint a temporary guardian for
the incapacitated person for a specified period and specified purpose. A temporary
guardian has the care and custody of the ward for the purpose so specified. The author-
ity of the permanent guardian previously appointed by the court is suspended while the
temporary guardian has authority. A temporary guardian may be removed at any time
and shall make any report the court requires.
OR. REV. STAT. § 126.133 (1979-1980). In California, a temporary guardianship statute was held
unconstitutional by the California Court of Appeals in Katz v. Superior Court of San Francisco,
73 Cal. App. 3d 952, 141 Cal. Rptr. 234 (1977). The statute was repealed and a new statute was
enacted in 1979. See CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 2250-2258 (West 1981). See aso VT. SEN. COMM. FOR
THE INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGED DECEPTIVE, FRAUDULENT AND CRIMINAL PRACTICES OF VARI-
OUS ORGANIZATIONS IN THE STATE, 54TH BIENNIAL SEss., REPORT, at 5 (1977) (committee rec-
ommended the adoption of legislation allowing ex parte appointments of temporary guardians),
11
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time the judge decides whether the control should continue."5 9 During
the period of the temporary guardianship the petitioner has an oppor-
tunity to deprogram the ward.
The temporary conservatorship has been utilized on several occa-
sions by the prosecutor's office in Pima County, Arizona, to obtain the
release of cult members pursuant to legal process. The prosecutors
help the families of cult members acquire a writ of habeas corpus or-
dering the cult leaders to produce the member for a competency hear-
ing. As a precaution against the cult's tactics of hiding the victim or
transferring him to a distant commune, the writ may be served without
advance notice and in the early morning hours.
60
Commentators on the legal barriers to deprogramming are gener-
ally in favor of the use of guardianships for such a purpose even in
light of their constitutional deficiencies. One commentator writes:
Given the resistant nature of mind control and the very low
probability that a victim will leave the cult without outside
assistance, a remedy like conservatorship for individuals al-
ready inside the group appears to be unavoidable. As carried
out by the Arizona prosecutor's team, it also seems to accord
with the least-restrictive-alternative requirement.6
However, the temporary guardianship has not found favor in the
courts. In Katz v. Superior Court of San Francisco,62 parents were ap-
pointed temporary conservators of five young adults to permit
deprogramming of the conservatees from ideas allegedly instilled by a
religious cult. 63 On appeal, the court stated that the conservator statute
only applied to property and could not be used to control an individ-
ual's ideas. 6' The court further stated that in the absence of evidence
that the conservatee is "gravely disabled," as defined by the law of the
state, the processes of the state cannot be used to deprive the con-
servatee of his freedom of religious action.65 The court determined that
59. See Delgado supra note 45, at 88-89.
60. Id (citations omitted).
61. Delgado, supra note 48, at 90.
62. 73 Cal. App. 3d 952, 141 Cal. Rptr. 234 (1977).
63. Id
64. Id at 970, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 244.
65. Id at 988-89, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 256. The court stated:
The wrong of these things things, as I see it, is not in the money the victims part with half
so much as in the mental and spiritual poison they get. But that is precisely the thing the
Constitution put beyond the reach of the prosecutor, for the price of freedom of religion
or of speech or of the press is that we must put up with, and even pay for, a good deal of
rubbish.
Id (quoting United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 95 (1943) (Jackson, J., dissenting)); cf Taylor v.
1984]
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the evidence was insufficient to sustain a finding that there was good
cause for appointment of a temporary conservator.66
Similarly, in Taylor v. Gilmartin,67 a Tenth Circuit opinion apply-
ing Oklahoma law, the court refused to sanction the establishment of a
temporary guardianship. Taylor involved an action for damages in tort
by a cult member against his religious deprogrammers who had gained
custody over him through a temporary guardianship. The deprogram-
mers asserted the temporary guardianship as a defense. 8 The United
States Court of Appeals held that no Oklahoma law exists permitting a
temporary guardianship of an adult. Therefore, the guardianship was
void.69 The court also held, citing Katz, that use of Oklahoma's in-
sanity-guardianship or conservatorship statutes for the clear purpose of
obtaining court protection of deprogramming should not be allowed.7"
The court stated that "this is a situation in which there is a gross con-
certed interference with a very fundamental right, the right to choose
one's religion, and it is this underlying factor that makes the case ac-
tionable, or which greatly aggravates it."'"
Thus, the attempt to deprogram an individual brainwashed by a
religious cult, regardless of the procedure used, will be suspect as an
infringement on religious freedom. Courts that have considered the is-
sue, including the Tenth Circuit Court applying Oklahoma law,7" have
looked unfavorably on both the abduction approach and the use of
temporary guardianships.73
Gilmartin, 686 F.2d 1346 (10th Cir. 1982) (The Taylor court held that absent an Oklahoma statute
expressly providing for temporary guardianship, any order by a probate court attempting to estab-
lisha temporary guardianship would be void. Id at 1351).
66. Katz, 73 Cal. App. 3d at 981, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 251.
67. 686 F.2d 1346 (10th Cir. 1982).
68. Id at 1348-50.
69. Id at 1351-52. The deprogrammers took the position that the district judge derived the
broad power to order a temporary guardianship from OKLA. STAT. tit. 43A, § 55 (repealed 1980).
This section required a petitioner to seek an order directing the hospitalization of one who was
asserted to be mentally ill. The deprogrammers, however, petitioned for only a temporary guardi-
anship. Id.
70. 686 F.2d at 1361.
71. Id at 1362.
72. See Taylor v. Gilmartin, 686 F.2d 1346 (10th Cir. 1982)(attempt to deprogram through
temporary guardianship held void).
73. See Katz v. Superior Court of San Francisco, 73 Cal. App. 3d 952, 141 Cal. Rptr. 234
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IV. DEVELOPMENT OF OKLAHOMA GUARDIANSHIP LAW
Oklahoma guardianship law is governed by a statute74 enacted in
1910 which has since remained virtually unchanged.75 The appoint-
ment of a guardian is provided for in the following two sections:
851. Petitions for guardians of incompetent or insane
persons
When it is represented to the court upon verified petition
of any relative or friend, that any person is insane, or from
any cause mentally incompetent to manage his property, the
court shall cause notice to be given to the supposed insane or
incompetent . . of the time and place of hearing the case,
not less than five (5) days before the time so appointed, and
such insane or incompetent person, if able to attend, must be
produced before the court on the hearing . . 76
852. Guardian appointed, when
If after a full hearing and examination upon such peti-
tion, it appears to the judge of the district court that the per-
son in question is incapable of taking care of himself and
managing his property, he must appoint a guardian of his per-
son and estate, with the powers and duties in this article
specified.77
These sections were first interpreted by the Oklahoma Supreme
Court in 1912 in Shelby v. Farve.78 In attempting to precisely define
incompetency, the supreme court deferred to the California Probate
Code:
The phrase "incompetent," "mentally incompetent," and "in-
capable," as used in this chapter, shall be construed to mean
any person who, though not insane, is, by reason of old age,
disease, weakness of mind, or from any other cause, unable,
unassisted, to properly manage and take care of himself or his
property, and by reason thereof would be likely to be
deceived or imposed upon by artful or designing persons.79
74. OKLA. STAT. tit. 58, §§ 850-898.3 (1981).
75. See In re Polin, 675 P.2d 1013 (Okla. 1983).
76. OKLA. STAT. tit. 58, § 851 (1981).
77. Id § 852 (footnote omitted).
78. 33 Okla. 651, 126 P. 764 (1912) (alleged incompetent attempted to sell the land she owned
for grossly inadequate consideration).
79. Id at 655, 126 P. at 765 (quoting Cal. PROB. CODE § 1767 (Kerr's Cyc. Codes of Califor-
nia) (emphasis added). The court held that pursuant to this definition the parties were incompe-
tent and incapable of protecting themselves and their estate and therefore, the parties were certain
to be deceived by artful and designing persons. Id at 659, 126 P. at 767.
In Polin, both petitioner and respondent made much of the Shelby artful and designing per-
1984]
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The "artful or designing persons" definition adopted in Shelby has
repeatedly been applied in determining whether a guardian should be
appointed in a particular case."0 The Shelby court wrote that "[t]his
definition in our judgment fairly expresses the meaning intended by
our Legislature when these provisions were passed."',I Despite this de-
finitive language, another definition simultaneously developed in
Oklahoma courts. This second definition evolved in 1925 in In re Win-
nett's Guardiansh#782
Mental incompetency or incapacity is established when
there is found to exist an essential privation of the reasoning
powers or faculties, or where a person is incapable of under-
standing and acting with discretion in the ordinary affairs of life.
When it is not shown that such mental incompetency exists, it
is reversible error for the court to appoint a guardian of the
estate of an adult person."
The second definition has also been repeatedly applied, and some cases
have even applied both definitions.8 4 The Polin case was therefore nec-
essary to clarify the definition of "incompetency" in Oklahoma, in ad-
dition to resolving the conflict between Oklahoma guardianship law
and the free exercise of religion.
V. THE PoLiN Decision
A. Findings of the District Court
The Polin district court proceedings involved five days of testi-
mony and thirty-five exhibits, composed of books, financial statements,
sons test, which was applied in the 1968 case of In re Bogan, 441 P.2d 972 (Okla. 1968). Polin, 675
P.2d at 1015. In Bogan, the appointment of a guardian for a woman alleged incompetent was
denied even though she married a man thirty-five years her junior, contributed large sums of
money to his film-making project, could not remember things about her assets, did not receive
adequate rent from property she owned, had a $1200 plumbing bill and had a failure of memory
on the witness stand. Bogan, 441 P.2d at 974-75. The court stated that "[a] person's liberty and
the right to control his property should not be taken away or withheld except for urgent reasons."
Id at 974 (quoting In re Estate of Washam, 364 P.2d 896, 897 (Okla. 1961)). The trial court in
Polin also applied the artful and designing persons test. See In re Polin, No. PG 83-76, slip op. at
1 (Dist. Ct. Tulsa Cty. Okla. 1983).
80. See In re Bogan, 441 P.2d 972, 974 (Okla. 1968); In re Prince, 379 P.2d 845, 847 (Okla.
1963).
81. 33 Okla. at 655, 126 P. at 765.
82. 112 Okla. 43, 239 P. 603 (1925).
83. Id at 45, 239 P. at 605 (emphasis added). The primary evidence of incompetency was
inequality of bargaining power in a loan transaction and having been cheated by a tenant. The
court dismissed the guardianship proceeding for lack of sufficient evidence. Id.
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and psychological test results.35 The trial court made the following
findings: Ms. Polin's interpersonal skills are on the level of a nine-year-
old,86 she has difficulty with spatial distinctions,87 displays frustra-
tion,88 and uses a childlike decisionmaking process.89 Furthermore,
Ms. Polin's "childlike decision making process" prohibits her from be-
ing able to provide for minimal necessities. The court found that she
"not only cannot properly manage her own affairs, she has not exhib-
ited to this Court an understanding that her affairs need to be handled
at all."90 In summarizing the existence of Ms. Polin's deficiencies, the
trial court relied on the term "judgmental immaturity."'"
The trial court also outlined the factors which did not contribute to
the decision, which included Ms. Polin's average to above average in-
telligence, her academic achievement level, her employability and most
importantly, her religious choice.
92
85. In re Polin, No. PG 83-76, slip op. at 1 (Dist. Ct. Tulsa Cty. Okla. 1983).
86. Id at 3-4.




91. Id at 3. This term was used at the trial by Dr. Catherine Burden. Judge Frank wrote
that he was impressed with Dr. Burden's qualifications and demeanor, and that her testimony was
unbiased, professional and competent. Id
92. See Polin, 675 P.2d at 1014. In the decision of the court Judge Frank outlined the follow-
ing noncontributing factors:
(1) First and foremost among those factual issues with which this Court is not con-
cerned is Robin's religious choice. This State, whether acting through the legisla-
ture, the courts, or via a combination thereof cannot abridge the free exercise of
religion. The only exception to that seemingly absolute rule of federal and state
constitutional law is rare, minimally used, and absolutely not before this Court
today.
(2) Secondly, the evidence has been overwhelming, and wholly without contradiction
that Robin has an average to above average intellectual potential or I.Q. The Court
cannot even consider making the requested determination of incompetency on that
sort of foundation. Evidence of low I.Q. alone is insufficient, even if tied to low
academic achievement and physical handicap.
(3) Thirdly, the Court has also heard much evidence that despite Robin's high I.Q. her
academic achievement level is less than that for other people her age. In spite of the
difficulty that educators have in testing deaf students, that fact has been clearly
shown. However, such low academic achievement (compared to the population as
a whole - whether deaf of hearing) is not grounds for the requested adjudication of
incompetency. If that evidence were sufficient then many typical adults, including
graduates of our high schools would properly be so adjudicated. Even functional
illiterates cannot, merely by reason of their low academic skills be stripped of their
civil rights to control their own affairs. Poor academic achievement, in and of itself,
is not sufficient evidence for this Court to grant the requested relief.
(4) Fourthly, Robin's employment history shows her unable to get employment except
on charitable terms. Her previousjobs have been in special environments for which
deaf people were specifically provided. Once again, however, unemployability
alone is not grounds for a judicial determination of incompetency. It is unconstitu-
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Having determined that Ms. Polin was judgmentally immature
and that her deficiencies impaired her ability to "properly" handle her
affairs, it was then necessary to apply the last step of the artful and
designing persons test.93 The trial court found that the evidence indi-
cated that Robin was susceptible to being taken advantage of by artful
and designing persons, observing that Robin was surrounded by Chris-
tian friends who "have designs-at least--on what they call her 'salva-
tion,' her 'soul' and her 'redemption'. Into this theological morass this
Court should not and shall not tread." 94 The trial court also observed
that these friends were "artful," because they lied to Robin's parents
and encouraged Robin to lie to them as well. 95 Thus, according to the
trial court, Robin met all three prongs of the artful and designing per-
sons test for establishing incompetency.
B. Holding of the Oklahoma Supreme Court
Several important rules and comments relating to Oklahoma
guardianship law should be noted from the majority opinion written by
Chief Justice Barnes. First, the Oklahoma Supreme Court deviated
from the "artful and designing persons test" by which to define incom-
petence, stating that the definition developed in Winnett is a better defi-
nition.96  Second, the court ruled that the primary purpose of
Oklahoma's guardianship law is the protection of property.97 Third,
the court held that the trial court's creation of a "judgmental immatur-
ity" standard was an overbroad construction of Oklahoma's guardian-
ship statutes, with its single effect being the denial of Robin Polin's
right to her religious beliefs.98 Lastly, the supreme court strictly scruti-
nized the trial court's factual determinations and failed to uphold the
trial court's findings on the basis of a lack of substantial evidence. 99
tional to prohibit vagrancy, and similarly, the inability or lack of desire to be self
supporting does not make one incompetent.
In re Polin, No. PG 83-76, slip op. at 2-3 (Dist. Ct. Tulsa Cty. Okla. 1983) (footnotes omitted).
93. In re Polin, No. PG 83-76, slip op. at 4-5 (Dist. Ct. Tulsa Cty. Okla. 1983).
94. Id at 4.
95. Id at 5.
96. Polin, 675 P.2d at 1015-16; see infra notes 107-08 and accompanying text.
97. Polin, 675 P.2d at 1014-15; see infra notes 100-13 and accompanying text.
98. Polin, 675 P.2d at 1014-16; see infra notes 114-124 and accompanying text.
99. Polin, 675 P.2d at 1016; see infra notes 126-39 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 19:668
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C. Analysis of Decision
1. Purpose of Guardianships
Language in the Oklahoma Supreme Court's opinion inPolin lim-
its the use of guardianships to the protection of property. The court
states that the "primary purpose" of Oklahoma's guardianship statutes
is to "protect people from dissipating the assets of their estates"' 00 and
to protect people from "being victimized by others desirous of depriv-
ing them of their property."'' This language raises the question of
whether Oklahoma's guardianship statutes can have secondary pur-
poses not directly related to the protection of an incompetent's
property.
Polin explicitly discusses the artful and designing persons test for
incompetency, and states that the test is "too vague to be applied to the
world of ideas,"'0 2 and that it "applies only to cases in which appoint-
ment of a guardian is necessary to protect an incompetent person from
losing property to deceitful persons .... 103 The court further ruled
that the protection of property is the situation contemplated by the
Oklahoma guardianship statutes'" and that the court "will not permit
application of this definition beyond [the protection of property] when
such application invades the area of personal ideas, thoughts and
beliefs."' 1 5
If this limiting language is strictly construed, a person who is in-
sane and incapable of properly taking care of himself, but who does not
possess property, would not be within the purview of Oklahoma's
guardianship statute. This construction would be unfortunate because
100. Polin, 675 P.2d at 1014-15. The protection of the ward's property is an important element
of the guardianship. See Taylor v. Gilmartin, 686 F.2d 1346, 1351 (10th Cir. 1982) (dicta); Shelby
v. Farve, 33 Okla. 651, 651-53, 126 P. 764, 764-65 (1912). In one Oklahoma case, the Oklahoma
Supreme Court dismissed a case involving a guardian's power to control the ward's right to enter
into a marriage contract. In re Campbell, 450 P.2d 203 (Okla. 1966). The court pointed out that
guardianships relate primarily to property rights. Id at 207. But Gf OKLA. STAT. tit. 15, § 24
(1981) ("After his incapacity has been judicially determined, a person of unsound mind can make
no conveyance or other contracts, nor designate any power, nor waive any right, until his restora-
tion to capacity is judicially determined."); National Life Ins. Co. v. Jayne, 132 F.2d 358 (10th Cir.
1942). The Jayne court stated that "where a person is adjudged incompetent any conveyance or
other contract attempted to be made by such person and any attempt by such person to designate
a person or waive a right during the time he remains under actual guardianship is void." Id at
360-61.
101. Polin, 675 P.2d at 1015.
102. Id (quoting Katz v. Superior Court of San Francisco, 73 Cal. App. 3d 952, 970, 141 Cal.
Rptr. 234, 244 (1977)).
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an incompetent may not have financial assets, 0 6 but such a person may
still need assistance in the everyday management of his affairs.
The Polin court was apparently sensitive to this legal gap in reme-
dies. Without expressing its reasoning, the court stated that the Win-
nett definition for incompetency was a better definition than the artful
and designing persons definition."0 7 The essence of the Winnell test is
that a person is incompetent when he "is incapable of understanding
and acting with discretion in the ordinary affairs of life."' Unlike the
artful and designing persons test, the language of the Winnell test con-
tains no reference to the protection of property. The Winnelt test in-
stead focuses on the inability of a person to function and to manage his
affairs. While providing the potential for more favorable results in
cases involving persons without property, the adoption of this defini-
tion is not consistent with the express language in the opinion limiting
the use of guardianships to the protection of property.
The language limiting the Oklahoma guardianship statutes to the
protection of property is further controverted by a written amendment
to the court's decision. In discussing the purpose of the guardianship
statute the court stated, "Additionally, the statute protects persons who
for any reason cannot make day-to-day decisions required of them in
order to function within our society."' 10 9
The reasoning for the court's application of a test that does not
have a primary purpose for the protection of property is not clear in
light of much of the language of the decision. Whether the decision
precludes the use of the artful and designing persons test is unanswer-
able from a strict reading of the opinion. However, a reasonable inter-
pretation of the decision would be to infer that the Winnell test is
applicable in a situation in which a person needs a guardianship, but
does not have property to be protected.
In Polin, the court applied both the Winnell and the artful and
designing persons tests."0 The court held that the characterization of
Robin as "judgmentally immature""' would not withstand either test.
106. Robin Polin, although not adjudged incompetent by the Oklahoma Supreme Court, did
not have any financial assets capable of being depleted by artful and designing persons. Id at
1016.
107. Id at 3086.
108. See In re Winnett's Guardianship, 112 Okla. 43, 45, 239 P. 603, 605 (1925).
109. Polin, 675 P.2d at 1015; Polin, 55 OKLA. B.J. 268, 268 (Jan. 30, 1984).
110. Polin, 675 P.2d at 1016.
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The court stated that Robin "does not have financial assets capable of
being depleted by artful and designing persons"' l and that "the evi-
dence clearly illustrates that Robin is 'capable of understanding and
acting. . . in the ordinary affairs of life.' "113 The court's decision does
not provide the guidelines that courts will need to determine when ap-
plication of each test is appropriate.
2. Denial of Robin Polin's Constitutional Right to Her
Religious Beliefs
In determining that the guardianship created by the trial court in-
terfered with Robin Polin's religious freedom, the Oklahoma Supreme
Court focused on deprogramming cases, including Katz v. Superior
Court of San Francisco"4 and Taylor v. Gilmartin."' Polin should be
distinguished from Katz and Taylor, however, because Polin did not
involve a deprogramming situation." 6 In both Katz and Taylor, a con-
servator was given almost unlimited and unrestricted control over a
conservatee for the duration of the conservatorship.' 7 The conserva-
tor's powers included the right to control the conservatee's body and
mind for the purpose of deprogramming. Conversely, in Polin, the
guardianship created by the trial court expressly prohibited the guard-
ian from exercising control over Robin's religious worship.1 8  The
guardianship included prohibitions against control over both Robin's
religious beliefs and religious acts." 9 Polin can be further distin-
112. Polin, 675 P.2d at 1016.
113. Id
114. 73 Cal. App. 3d 952, 141 Cal. Rptr. 234 (1977).
115. 686 F.2d 1346 (10th Cir. 1982).
116. The facts of Polin can easily be distinguished from the facts of the deprogramming cases.
See supra notes 62-71 and accompanying text; see also Brief of Appellee at 27, In re Polin, 675
P.2d 1013 (Okla. 1983). In this brief, the appellee states, "[Riespondent's fixation on 'deprogram-
ming' is unwarranted. No one is deprogramnming anyone else. The record simply does not con-
tain any evidence on the deprogramming of Robin Polin. A rather inflammatory argument,
sounds devious and anti-God and constitution, but it is simply not happening." Id
117. In Katz, the conservatorship order gave the conservator substantial control over the con-
servatee. See Katz, 73 Cal. App. 3d at 956 n.l, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 235 n.l. The Katz order required
the conservator to be present with the conservatee at all times, and gave the conservator the right
to choose the conservatee's residence, whether inside or outside the state. Id In Taylor, the tem-
porary guardianship order gave the temporary guardian the following powers: "[t]o (a) take said
proposed ward into Petitioner's personal custody to have proposed ward counselled, examined,
and treated by persons including, but not limited to physicians, psychiatrists, psychologists, social
workers and lay persons; (b) to keep said ward in Petitioner's custody, even in the event said ward
wishes to leave said custody; and (c) such further powers as are necessary to exercise those above
granted." Taylor v. Gilmartin, 686 F.2d 1346, 1349 (10th Cir. 1982).
118. See In re Polin, No. PG 83-76, slip op. at 6 (Dist. Ct. Tulsa Cty. Okla. 1983).
119. Id. By expressly prohibiting all control over Robin's religious acts as well as beliefs, the
guardianship properly reflected the concerns of the United States Supreme Court decisions re-
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guished from Katz because the trial court's orders in Katz contained
"no findings of fact which would disclose the ground or grounds on
which the orders were based."' 2 ° In contrast, the Polin trial court ex-
plicitly enumerated not only those factors which contributed to its deci-
sion, but also those which did not. In citing and relying on Katz and
Taylor, the supreme court did not note the difference in the degree to
which the guardian or conservator was allowed to influence and control
the ward, or the differences in the trial courts' disclosures of facts.
A careful and strict reading of the Oklahoma Supreme Court's
opinion does not reveal with certainty whether any guardianship that
affects religion will be unconstitutional. Language in the opinion indi-
cates that the court's holding was weighted heavily by its determination
that infringement of religion was the "single effect" of the guardian-
ship.'21 An inference can be drawn from this language that a guardian-
ship can address religious practice so long as it has some other
compelling objective and is closely tailored to achieve that objective.122
This is a reasonable inference since almost every guardianship will in
some way, as a necessary and practical incident of its existence, affect
the ward's practice of religion.
An alternative interpretation is also possible. A strict reading of
Polin could indicate that no matter how carefully a guardianship is
tailored, and how legitimate its objective, it may be impermissible to
affect religious worship at all.2 3 Such an interpretation of Polin is in-
garding the fundamental right of freedom of religion. See supra notes 29-41 and accompanying
text. The guardianship also reflected the view of the Oklahoma Supreme Court. See L'Aquarius
v. Maynard, 634 P.2d 1310 (Okla. 1981); Lewellyn v. State, 592 P.2d 538 (Okla. Crim. App. 1979).
120. Katz, 73 Cal. App. 3d at 963, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 240.
121. Polin, 675 P.2d at 1014, 1016. "The trial court's creation of a vague standard such as
'judgmental immaturity' cannot be permitted as camouflage for the single effect of its decision, the
denial of Robin Polin's right to her religious beliefs." Id But see supra text accompanying note 15
(language of Judge Frank's order). A literal reading of the order indicates that Robin Polin's right
to her religious beliefs is the one area that the guardianship will not affect. Id
122. Seesupra notes 21-28 and accompanying text (discussing the least restrictive alternative).
A clarification of this vague rule of law can be found in the Oklahoma Court of Criminal
Appeals' opinion in Lewellyn v. State, 592 P.2d 538 (Okla. Crim. App. 1979). This case involved a
first amendment challenge of the marijuana laws of Oklahoma by the sovereign of the Holy
American Church on the basis that the laws do not provide for use of the drug as a religious
sacrament. Id at 539. The court stated: "Religious liberty is not an unlimited freedom, and
while laws cannot interfere with mere religious belief and opinions, they may inhibit certain acts
or practices .... The religious liberty intended by the framers of the Constitution is not a
license unrestrained by law." Id at 540.
123. The Oklahoma Supreme Court stated that "We will not permit application of [the defini-
tion of incompetency] beyond [the parameters of protection of property] when such application
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consistent with United States Supreme Court and Oklahoma decisions
that have allowed interference with religious acts under many circum-
stances. 124 Because of the different possible interpretations of the
supreme court's opinion in Polin, the Oklahoma Supreme Court has
created much uncertainty regarding the extent to which a guardianship
may affect religion without violating the ward's constitutional rights.
The trial court recognized that the realm of religious freedom was
not the place to insert a substitute decision-maker and therefore ex-
pressly restricted the guardian's right to interfere in Robin's chosen
form of worship. The finely-tailored guardianship created by the trial
court was not expressly mandated by Oklahoma law, but the guardian-
ship did exemplify the spirit behind the Boyer decision. 25 In reviewing
such a guardianship, a reviewing court should carefully examine the
trial court's order to determine the extent to which it infringes upon
religious freedom. The infringement should be weighed against the
need for the guardianship in that particular case. However, in review-
ing the guardianship in Polin, it is evident that the Oklahoma Supreme
Court did not properly consider the need for the guardianship or its
full effect. As a result, the Polin decision will have the effect of under-
mining the efforts of trial judges to create guardianships when even the
slightest possibility exists that it will interfere with the right to religious
freedom. This will produce unfortunate results in situations where the
facts indicate that an individual is incompetent and therefore in need of
a guardianship over his person and property.
3. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Much of Oklahoma's guardianship law is derived from the laws of
California 126 and South Dakota 127 and, as in those jurisdictions, discre-
tionary powers have developed in Oklahoma's probate courts.1 28 "In
124. See supra notes 29-42 and accompanying text. The expression of this view may be found
in Lewellyn v. State, 592 P.2d 538 (Okla. Crim. App. 1979), wherein the court stated:
Religious liberty is not an unlimited freedom, and while laws cannot interfere with mere
religious belief and opinions, they may inhibit certain acts or practices. . . One cannot
stretch this liberty so as to interfere with that of his neighbor or violate police regulations
or the penal laws of the land, enacted for the good order and general welfare of all the
people.
Id. at 540 (citing McMasters v. State, 21 Okla. Crim. 318, 207 P. 566 (1922)).
125. In re Polin, No. PG 83-76, slip op. at 6 (Dist. Ct. Tulsa Cty. Okla. 1983). The guardian-
ship order was structured to protect the fundamental rights of the ward. See supra text accompa-
nying note 15.
126. See Kersey v. McDougal, 79 Okla. 53, 58, 191 P. 594, 599 (1920); Polin, 675 P.2d at 1015.
127. See Fish v. Deaver, 71 Okla. 177, 180, 176 P. 251, 253 (1918).
128. See In re Cowper's Estate, 179 Cal. 347, -, 176 P. 676, 677 (1918); In re Knott's Guardi-
1984]
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the appointment of guardians, the county courts are vested with a
sound legal discretion; and their judgments in such cases will not be
overruled, unless it is apparent that there has been an abuse of such
discretion." '129
When ascertaining whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain the
trial court's decision, the supreme court must give deference to the trial
court's observations and findings regarding the credibility of witnesses,
especially when conflicting testimony exists. 130  The court has held
"that credibility of witnesses and effect and weight to be given to con-
flicting or inconsistent testimony are questions of fact to be determined
by the trier of the facts, whether court or jury, and are not questions of
law for the Supreme Court on appeal."' 131 Numerous statements con-
cerning the same principle of law have been published by the
Oklahoma Supreme Court in regard to guardianship proceedings. 132
In the guardianship proceedings in Polin, the trial court character-
ized Robin as judgmentally immature. 133 The supreme court held that
the sole effect of judgmental immaturity as a standard of incompetency
was an abridgment of the constitutionally guaranteed right to free exer-
cise of religious beliefs. 34 However, the written decision of the trial
anship, 71 S.D. 53, -, 21 N.W.2d 59, 61 (1945). An abuse of discretion or a clear deficiency of
evidence wil be required for the trial court's decision to be overruled. Gould v. Smith, 405 P.2d
82, 83 (Okla. 1965); In re Estate of Fox, 365 P.2d 1002, 1006 (Okla. 1961); In re Vaughn's Guardi-
anship, 205 Okla. 438, 239 P.2d 403 (1951). But see In re Winnett's Guardianship, 112 Okla. 43,
239 P. 603 (1925) (Oklahoma Supreme Court reviewed all evidence and reversed judgment ap-
pointing guardian due to lack of sufficient competent evidence).
129. In re Estate of Fox, 365 P.2d 1002, 1006 (Okla. 1961) (quoting Brigman v. Cheney, 27
Okla. 510, 510, 112 P. 993, 993 (1910)).
130. "Where the evidence is in conflict and there is competent evidence and inferences that
may be drawn therefrom to reasonably sustain the verdict rendered and the verdict rendered has
the affirmative approval of the trial court, this court will not disturb the verdict." In re Carney's
Guardianship, I10 Okla. 165, 167, 237 P. 11, 113 (1925) (citations omitted).
131. In re Estate of Washam, 364 P.2d 896, 897 (Okla. 1961); see Plumer v. Pierce, 208 Okla.
526, 257 P.2d 813 (1953).
132. This proposition has also been endorsed in California. See Katz, 73 Cal. App. 3d at 980,
141 Cal. Rptr. at 250-25 1; In re Walters, 37 Cal. App. 2d 239, 231 P.2d 473 (1951). The court inIn
re Carney's Guardianship, 110 Okla. 165, 167, 237 P. 111, 113 (1925) stated:
We are also of the opinion that it was sufficient to sustain the findings of the referee, who
had the parties and the witnesses before him in the taking of the testimony in this cause,
and who was in a better position to weigh the testimony and give the proper weight to
the testimony of each witness than is this court upon the record presented here.
In re Bogan, 441 P.2d, 972 (Okla. 1968) involved the failure of memory on the witness stand of the
alleged incompetent. The court stated that "we must defer to the trial court, who observed her
demeanor and was aware of her inflections and attitude and the circumstances of the question-
ing." Id at 975.
133. In re Polin, No. PG 83-76, slip op. at 3 (Dist. Ct. Tulsa Cty. Okla. 1983); see Pa/n, 675 P.
2d at 1014.
134. Polin, 675 P.2d at 1014.
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court makes it clear that the trial court did not rely solely on a vague
term of psychological art, but instead based its decision on several spe-
cific mental deficiencies. 35 After a strict application of the artful and
designing persons test to these factual determinations, the trial court
felt compelled to adjudge Robin mentally incompetent. 136  The
Oklahoma Supreme Court's attack on the trial court's terminology was
not a fair review of the trial court's decision, given the facts underlying
the trial court's standard of judgmental immaturity. The guardianship
in Polin was a lengthy proceeding that involved conflicting facts and
conflicting testimony. The trial court had the benefit of personally ob-
serving the proceeding to give appropriate weight to the credibility of
the witnesses. The trial court even required that the petitioners prove
the incompetence of the respondent by clear and convincing evidence
though such a heavy burden of proof was not expressly mandated
under the circumstances. 37 Even though the supreme court applied a
different test for incompetency than the test applied by the trial court, it
is difficult to understand how the supreme court could have made op-
posite conclusions of fact about Robin Polin while still deferring to the
trial court's findings.'38
VI. CONCLUSION
In re Polin involved disputed facts and difficult issues regarding
sensitive fundamental constitutional rights in the context of a stigma-
tizing legal proceeding. It was inevitable that whatever decision would
be rendered would receive contradictory reviews.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court reversed the trial court's decision
in Polin and in so doing clarified old law and created new law. How-
ever, many uncertanties still exist concerning the application of these
principles of law. It was the court's first opportunity to consider the
conflicts between Oklahoma's guardianship laws and the fundamental
constitutional right to free exercise of religious beliefs. By its holding
in Polin, the Oklahoma Supreme Court has greatly disabled the power
of probate courts to accommodate conflicting doctrines with a carefully
created and finely tailored guardianship. The holding also left many
135. See supra notes 85-92 and accompanying text.
136. In re Polin, No. PG 83-76, slip op. at 5 (Dist. Ct. Tulsa Cty. Okla. 1983).
137. In re Polin, No. PG 83-76, slip op. at 9 n.7 (Dist. Ct. Tulsa Cty. Okla. 1983).
138. Polin, 675 P.2d at 1014-16.
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collateral questions unanswered. As a consequence, the court can ex-
pect to review the same issues many times in the future.
Spencer C. Barasch
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF TULSA COUNTY
STATE OF OKLAHOMA
In The Matter Of the Guardianship Of
ROBIN ANDREA POLIN ) case number PG 83-76)
Decision of the Court
12 May 1983
Robert D. Frank
Judge of the District Court*
I. ISSUES
The Court is today faced with a decision made difficult by reason
of extraordinarily complex legal issues, tragic facts, and disagreement
among expert witnesses. In addition, this Court's research indicates it
is a case of first impression.
The facts have been shown to the Court in testimony over five
days, and the Court has been offered 35 exhibits, including books,
financial statements and psychological test results. Notwithstanding
this great array of information before the Court, the issues-both fac-
tual and legal-can be briefly and accurately set forth.
Robin Polin is 18 years old. She has been deaf and mute since
birth. She was raised in a Jewish family. Beginning in about March of
1982 she became interested in a sect of Christianity which can only be
called "fundamentalist." Her interest in and desire to be converted to
this strain of the Baptist, Christian religion caused friction with her
Jewish parents. Finally, Robin left home and in response to that, her
parents petitioned this Court to adjudicate her as "an incompetent per-




Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 19 [1983], Iss. 4, Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol19/iss4/3
TULSA L4W JOURNAL
son." That phrase is defined under the statutory and case law of this
State. In spite of this apparent motive, the testimony has not been lim-
ited to this religious conflict.
Before determing the ultimate issues before the Court today, it is
appropriate for the Court to specify the law and the facts used by the
Court to make this determination.
II. LEGAL DEFINITION OF INCOMPETENCY
Regarding "incompetency" the legislature has mandated the Court
that if ". . . it appears to the judge. . . that the person in question is
incapable of taking care of himself and managing his property, he must
appoint a guardian." (Emphasis added.)'
Our State Supreme Court has attempted to clarify the phrase "in-
capable of taking care of himself and managing his property" by stat-
ing that it means that if a person, for any cause is "unable or incapable,
unassisted, of properly taking care of himself or managing his property
and who by reason thereof, would be likely to be deceived or imposed
upon by artful or designing persons"2 then in that event that person is
"incompetent" and a guardian must be appointed. 21
It is unfortunate that the term first used by our legislature in 1910
(ie. "incompetent") is still in use. It is offensive to modem usage, and is
prone to be misunderstood by laymen, as well as to carry with it images
of insanity, retardation, mental illness, and other opprobrious and in-
correct terms. It would not be improper to equate the law's use of the
term "incompetent" with the layman's term "disabled."3
In addition to the semantical problems inherent in the use of the
term "incompetent" the legal definition causes one other problem. As
quoted above, the Oklahoma Supreme Court has explained the statu-
tory term by use of the qualifying phrase to the effect that one is incom-
petent if one cannot PROPERLY care for one's affairs without
assistance. That begs the question, "Properly, according to whose stan-
dards?" Never has that question been as troublesome to this Court as it
is in this case where the alleged improper management includes a reli-
gious choice. Courts do not sit to determine if one acts properly based
upon religious preference.
1. 58 O.S. 1981 sections 851, 852
2. In Re the Guardianship of Bogan 441 P2d 972,976 (Ok. 1968)
3. Bogan, supra; Mathews v. Acacia Mutual Life Insurance Co. 392 P2d 369 (Ok. 1964)
[Vol. 19:668
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III. EVIDENCE BEFORE THE COURT WHICH CANNOT CONSTITUTE
INCOMPETENCY
In determining if Robin Polin is unable, unassisted, to properly
manage her own affairs, and by reason thereof is likely to be taken
advantage of, it would simplify matters somewhat if the Court first
sorted out what evidence and factual issues are clearly not of concern to
this proceeding.
1. First and foremost among those factual issues with which this
Court is not concerned is Robin's religious choice. This State, whether
acting through the legislature, the courts, or via a combination thereof
cannot abridge the free exercise of religion.' The only exception to that
seemingly absolute rule of federal and state constitutional law is rare,
minimally used, and absolutely not before this Court today.'
2. Secondly, the evidence has been overwhelming, and wholly
without contradiction that Robin has an average to above average in-
tellectual potential or I.Q. The Court cannot even consider making the
requested determination of incompetency on that sort of foundation.
Evidence of low I.Q. alone is insufficient, even if tied to low academic
achievement and physical handicap.
3. Thirdly, the Court has also heard much evidence that despite
Robin's high I.Q. her academic achievement level is less than that for
other people her age. In spite of the difficulty that educators have in
testing deaf students, that fact has been clearly shown. However, such
low academic achievement (compared to the population as a whole -
whether deaf or hearing) is not grounds for the requested adjudication
of incompetency. If that evidence were sufficient then31 many typical
adults, including graduates of our high schools would properly be so
adjudicated. Even functional illiterates cannot, merely by reason of
their low academic skills be stripped of their civil rights to control their
own affairs. Poor academic achievement, in and of itself, is not suffi-
cient evidence for this Court to grant the requested relief.
4. Fourthly, Robin's employment history shows her unable to get
employment except on charitable terms. Her previous jobs have been
in special environments for which deaf people were specifically pro-
vided. Once again, however, unemployability alone is not grounds for
a judicial determination of incompetency. It is unconstitutional to pro-
4. U.S. Constitution, Amendment One; Oklahoma Constitution Art.I, section 2
5. 51 Southern California Law Review, no. 1, pg. 1,8 "Religions Totalism: Gentle and Un-
gentle Persuasion Under the First Amendment by Robert Delgado, fn.#5
1984]
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hibit vagrancy,6 and similarly, the inability or lack of desire to be self
supporting does not make one incompetent.
IV. JUDGMENTAL IMMATURITY
The above four (4) areas are clearly not grounds for determining
Robin to be incompetent. The Court is left with one other allegation in
need of inquiry where the evidence was more contradictory. That area
is Robin's degree of "judgmental maturity."
Viewing this evidence in light of the rules of law mentioned previ-
ously, the Court must determine three things-if.
a) Robin is deficient in this area, and
b) if so whether the deficiency impairs her from "properly"
handling her affairs, and
c) if by reason thereof she can be taken advantage of by art-
ful and designing persons.
A. Existence of Defciency
The testimony of expert witnesses varied greatly in assessing
Robin's maturity in interpersonal and social relationships. The Court,
when sitting as trier of the facts (eg. when no jury is present) need not
surrender its determination of the facts to the expert witnesses, for the
testimony of an expert, like that of any other witness is to be evaluated
for weight and credit by the trier of fact.7
The Court hereby determines, as a matter of fact, that Robin Polin
does suffer, at this time, from a deficiency in her ability to make per-
sonal decisions. In making this determination the Court was impressed
with the qualifications, demeanor, and testimony of Dr. Catherine Bur-
den. Dr. Burden's unbiased, professional and competent testimony
showed that as recently as last year Robin's interpersonal 141 and deci-
sion making skills were on the level of a nine (9) year old child. She
also indicated that Robin's difficulty with spatial distinctions may indi-
cate some problems in addition to her judgmental deficiency.
B. Ability to Properly Manage Her Affairs
Having determined that Robin's judgmental maturity is grossly
out of line with others of her age, and consistent with that of young
children, the Court must now turn to the question of whether or not
6. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville 405 U.S. 156 (1972)
7. Oklahoma Uniform Jury Instructions - Civil#3.21
[Vol. 19:668
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this pschological/social problem prohibits Robin from "properly" tak-
ing care of herself and managing her own affairs.
Robin's testimony showed that her psychological immaturity does
prohibit her from "properly" taking care of her affairs. She is subject
to displays of frustration that could not be tolerated in social and com-
mercial intercourse. While her deafness may be a contributing factor
to this, her deafness is not her impediment to properly managing her-
self and her affairs. Her childlike decision making process prohibits
her from even considering her physical wellbeing and how she can pro-
vide for even the minimal necessities of life. She is led from house to
house by people she perceives as her friends, without concern or
thought to her future. . . . except her vague and persistent desire to"
. . . serve the Lord..."
She not only cannot properly manage her own affairs, she has not
exhibited to this Court an understanding that her affairs need to be
handled at all.
C. Ability to be Taken Advantage of by Designing Persons
Robin, then, does have a psychological deficiency which prohibits
her from properly managing her own affairs. Some of the cases defin-
ing incompetency add the requirement that the respondent, by reason
of her disability must also be able to be taken advantage of by artful or
designing persons.' That term is no where defined nor does the Court
find that it is especially helpful in determining incompetency.
Nonetheless, in order to insure that the Court properly addresses
the issues the Court should comment on the "artful or designing per-
sons" prong of the test for competency.
Robin is currently surrounded by what have been described as her
"Christian 'friends.'" That they are "designing" is agreed by all. They
have designs-at least--on what they call her "salvation," her "soul"
and her "redemption". Into this theological morass this Court should
not and shall not tread. Nor will [M] this Court of civil law editorialize
on the motives or intentions of Robin's co-religionists.
That these so-called "Christian 'friends'" are artful in their tactics
is also clear. In prostelytizing their religion they have determined that
the conversion of young Robin justifies the violation of one of their
cardinal commandments-that one should not lie. For both Donna
8. In Re the Guardianship of Prince 379 P2d 845 (Ok. 1963)
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Hull and Rev. Peknik lied to Robin's parents and encouraged Robin to
lie to them as well. They have thereby taken advantage of her gross
judgmental immaturity.
It is not the province of this Court to moralize or rule on such
behavior. But it clearly shows that persons with designs upon Robin
(however good their intentions may be) are artful and deceitful in pur-
suit of their objective.
THE COURT WOULD HEREBY FIND THAT ROBIN POLIN
IS AN INCOMPETENT PERSON, IN THAT SHE CANNOT
PROPERLY MANAGE HER AFFAIRS AND TAKE CARE OF
HERSELF, AND BY REASON THEREOF CAN BE TAKEN AD-
VANTAGE OF BY ARTFUL OR DESIGNING PERSONS.9
V. APPOINTMENT OF GUARDIAN
This trial has been bifurcated. Now that the adjudication of in-
competency has been made, however, a guardian must be appointed.
The primary applicants for that fiduciary relationship are Robin's par-
ents: Paul and Marsha Polin.
A separate hearing will be held to make the permanent appoint-
ment. Pending that hearing and the appointment of a general (perma-
nent) guardian, someone must immediately be appointed to take care
and custody of her person and estate.
Under the evidence the Court cannot appoint Paul Polin in that
capacity. Such appointment is clearly not in the best interest of Robin.
To appoint Marsha would subject Robin to the home and indirect
control of Paul and therefore would also be inappropriate.
THE COURT WILL APPOINT BARBARA POLIN AS SPE-
CIAL (TEMPORARY) GUARDIAN OF THE PERSON AND ES-
TATE OF ROBIN.10
This appointment is effective immediately, and will remain effec-
tive until further order of the Court. Any interested party may apply to
the Court for appointment as permanent guardian. Upon application
the Court will set a hearing date on that issue. If no applications are
filed before 31 May 1983, Barbara Polin will be appointed permanent
9. The Oklahoma statutes and authorities do not duscuss the burden of proof in guardian-
ship cases. While a guardianship is not the same as a determination of involuntary commitment
in mental health proceedings, the Court nonetheless has used the more strict test of burden of
proof, to-wit: that the petitioner's have proven the incompetence of the respondent by clear and
convincing evidence. See Addington v. Texas 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
10. 30 O.S. 1981 section 5
[Vol. 19:668
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guardian. 1 [6]
VI. RESTRICTIONS OF GUARDIAN
The temporary guardian of Robin is advised of the following re-
strictions upon her powers and duties:
1. The ward is not to be controlled directly or indirectly by
Paul Polin. The guardian serves as an officer of the Court,
and shall receive necessary directions from the Court, upon
application.
2. The right to religious preference being a fundamental
constitutional right, the guardian is expressly forbidden from
interfering in Robin's chosen form of religious worship. The
only exception to this restriction is if said religious practice
would be of immediate danger to the health or financial well-
being of the ward. This restriction is made in spite of the per-
sonal disagreement that the guardian may have with the
choice Robin may make. Other than the restrictions and ex-
ceptions set forth herein, no other interference with Robin's
religious preference or worship shall be made by the guardian
except upon application and order from this Court.
3. The guardian shall not allow the ward to travel out of the
State of Oklahoma without Order of the Court.
VII. LIMITATIONS OF CASE TO FACTS AT BAR
Having made the required findings of fact and conclusions of law
the Court has discharged its duty by rendering judgment. In this par-
ticular case it is proper to add some additional clarifying comments. In
finding Robin Polin incompetent this Court has not made any adjudi-
cation on the status of handicapped people, or of all deaf or hearing
impaired people. To so conclude is a misstatement of this Court's
ruling.
The determination of incompetency is based upon the particular
evidence presented in this particular case. Each case is unique and the
Court is cognizant of the individuality of each litigant who appears
before it.
Today's ruling stands for one proposition and only one proposi-
tion. That is that Robin Polin is at this time, an incompetent person
11. 30 O.S. 1981 section 4; At this hearing no preferential right to appointment will be af-
forded Paul or Marsha Polin merely by reason of blood relationship to the respondent. See Ned v.
Robinson 74 P2d 1156 (Ok. 1938); In Re Fegans Guardianship 45 Cal 176 (1872)
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under the laws of the State of Oklahoma based upon the evidence
before this Court.
VIII. REVIEW
Oklahoma law does contemplate the restoration to competency.
Statutory procedures 12 are enacted for that expressed purpose. Robin
is fortunate that171 her disability, under the evidence, is one that she will
surely out grow. The Court looks forward to the day when evidence
can be presented showing a sufficient improvement in the areas dis-
cussed. At that time the Court will be happy indeed to perform its duty
. . . . to enter an order of restoration.
To insure continued judicial scrutiny in that regard, this matter
will be set for review on 17th the May day [sic] of May 1984 at 2:00
o'clock P.M. This, of course is without prejudice to any interested
party filing an application for hearing on any appropriate ground at
any time.
IX. SUMMARY OF RULING
In summary, the Court would, at this time, order that:
1. Robin Polin is unable, unassisted to properly manage her
affairs and by reason thereof can be taken advantage of by
artful and designing persons.
2. Robin Polin is therefore incompetent under the laws of
the State of Oklahoma.
3. Barbara Polin is appointed special/temporary guardian
forthwith. 13
4. Applications for appointment of a general/permanent
guardian should be filed by 31 May 1983. Upon receipt
thereof the Court will set a hearing date.
5. If no applications are filed, Barbara Polin will become
general/permanent guardian on 1 June 1983.
6. The guardian is prohibited and restricted from interfering
with the ward's free expression of religion, except if same
would be of immediate danger to the health or financial well-
being of the ward.
12. 58 O.S. 1981 section 854
13. Bond will be set in the amount of $500. Barbara Polin, upon subscribing the oath of
guardian of the person, and having the Court sign the letter of Guardianship will assume her
duties as guardian of the person. She shall not act as guardian of the estate until her bond is
posted and approved by the Court. 58 O.S. 1981 section 853
[Vol. 19:668
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7. The Ward is prohibited from leaving the State of
Oklahoma except upon order of the Court.
8. This matter will be passed for review to 17th day of May
1984 at 2:00 o'clock P.M., without prejudice to any inter-
ested party applying for any appropriate hearing at any other
time.
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